Lovely ruby color. No sediment to speak of yet. Intense aromas of cherry, tea, and smoke. On the palate, there is firm structure and a meaty quality. Should continue to improve for a few more years, but (sadly) this was my last bottle. Good match for grilled duck breast. Grade: 91
This beautiful example of cool climate Zinfandel was a perfect match for a strip steak and fries as I start my Labor Day weekend. It's a blend of 98% Zinfandel and 2% Petite Sirah. I'd love to ask Paul Draper what he thought the dash of Petite Sirah added (or maybe he just had a little left over?). Deep ruby color, having thrown a very modest amount of sediment. Ideal with about 45 minutes in the decanter. On the nose and palate, it called to mind cherries, blackberries, and Chambord, as well as Cabernet-like notes of cassis, tobacco, leather, and mocha java. Delicious. Might improve for a while but is hard to resist now. Grade: 90.
Nearly every Senate Democrat on Monday called on the Securities and Exchange Commission to require corporations to disclose their political spending.
Forty-four Senate Democrats made the push in a letter to SEC Chairman Mary Jo White, the latest in a series of appeals to the agency to craft such rules. The requests have all been met with little public comment from Ms. White.
As that might suggest, this is more of a partisan issue than a securities regulation matter, even though the Democrat's academic enablers (you know who you are) insist it's just about good policy. As I have often complained:
Speaking of Bebchuk, his post praising the 44 Senators claims:
The letter of the forty-four Senators highlights the remarkable level of support that the rulemaking petition has received. The SEC should proceed with rulemaking in this area without further delay.
What Bebchuk fails to tell his readers is that all 44 are Democrats. He thus continues to studiously ignore the blatantly partisan nature of his campaign in favor of the rule making petition. As I took the liberty of mentioning on his site (assuming it survives moderation).
Abstract: This congressional testimony summarizes the effects on consumers and the economy of Dodd-Frank, the Durbin Amendment the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and other government regulations (such as the CARD Act of 2009) enacted in the wake of the recent financial crisis. The testimony notes that the combined effect of these laws and regulations has resulted in higher bank fees, a dramatic reduction in access to free checking, an increase in the number of unbanked consumers, a dramatic reduction in access to credit cards for low-income consumers, and continued low access to mortgages, especially among lower-income and higher-risk borrowers. In addition, because of the crushing and disproportionate burden of Dodd-Frank’s regulations on smaller banks, the law has promoted consolidation of the banking industry and forced many smaller banks to exit certain product markets, especially mortgages. This combined effect has reduced choice and competition for consumers. Finally, the lack of democratic accountability over the CFPB has resulted in an agency defined by bureaucratic overreach, resulting in an invasive and reckless data-mining project and assertion over many industries and products that stand outside of the agency’s authorized jurisdiction.
The Obama administration is considering a law professor favored by Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D., Mass.) for an open spot on the Securities and Exchange Commission, according to people familiar with the process.
Lisa Fairfax, a professor at George Washington University Law School, was floated by Ms. Warren earlier this summer as part of a list of potential candidates that she and others who back tighter Wall Street oversight offered to fill the Democratic seat on the U.S.’s top securities regulator, these people said. ...
In her academic work, she has focused on how investors choose company directors and boardroom diversity, and she has written a primer on shareholder activism. Earlier this week, she was tapped by SEC Chairman Mary Jo White to fill a vacancy on an advisory panel that makes policy recommendations to the commission on investor concerns.
I've met and corresponded with Lisa many times and am a great admirer of her as a scholar and person. She's super smart and super nice. I think she'd make a great SEC Commissioner, especially because (despite being a Democrat) she's got a solid base of knowledge and common sense.
Some of my friends on the right likely will be inclined to oppose Lisa just because Liz Warren is backing her. If so, however, they'd be making a sense. Lisa's got more common sense and basic decency in her little finger than Warren does in her whole body.
I cannot imagine a Democrat candidate for the SEC I'd feel better about. I hope she makes it.
The Section on Business Associations at the 2016 Annual Meeting will honor 13 professors for their exemplary mentorship: Lynne L. Dallas (San Diego); Claire MooreDickerson (Tulane); Christopher Drahozal (Kansas); Egon Guttman (American); William A. “Bill” Klein (UCLA); Donald C. Langevoort (Georgetown); Juliet Moringiello (Widener Commonwealth); Marleen O’Connor (Stetson); Terry O’Neill (Emerita, Tulane); Charles “Chuck” O’Kelley (Seattle); Alysa L. Rolack (formerly of Indiana-Bloomington); Roberta Romano (Yale); and Gordon Smith (BYU).
Thank you to all these honorees for your service to legal education through thoughtful, caring, and inspiring mentorship. You have helped others in our field in countless ways.
The criteria for nominations included:
Is eager to discuss others’ early ideas and contributes to the development and improvement of others’ work;
Promotes and encourages the success of junior scholars by reading and providing meaningful and useful feedback on drafts;
Promotes a supportive but challenging environment for conference presentations;
Speaks frankly, provides useful professional and personal advice when asked;
Actively participates in a network of scholars;
Facilitates professional opportunities for junior scholars such as providing introductions to others in the field, and encouraging participation in the scholarly community through writing and speaking;
Mentors those from underrepresented communities in academics and the study of law;
Actively/willingly participates in the promotion process for others by advising as to tenure reviewers, writing review letters, and providing useful guidance on career advancement.
I was delighted to be among those who nominated my friend, colleague, and coauthor Bill Klein. Bill has been a wonderful mentor to me for two decades. He is a supportive colleague, but also one of those rare people who can--without hurting your feelings--tell it to you straight. He once told me, to cite but a single example, that my first draft of an article was "crap" and "would ruin my career." He was right. So I fixed it and it went on to become one of my most frequently cited works. He taught me everything I know about editing casebooks and has been a constant source of encouragement. I'm proud to know him and to have been one of his proteges.
My friend Eric Orts has just had a new edition of his excellent book Business Persons: A Legal Theory of the Firm been published in a paperback edition. Eric took advantage of the occasion to write a new preface that discusses the controversial Hobby Lobby decision as well as other related developments. As the blurb says:
Business firms are ubiquitous in modern society, but an appreciation of how they are formed and for what purposes requires an understanding of their legal foundations. This book provides a scholarly and yet accessible introduction to the legal framework of modern business enterprises.
These findings seem consistent with the argument that we need to regulate insider trading so as to protect corporate property rights in information:
This paper assesses whether the enforcement of insider trading laws increases or decreases patent-based measures of technological innovation. Based on about 75,000 industry-country-year observations across 94 economies from 1976 to 2006, we find evidence consistent with the view that enforcing insider trading laws spurs innovation — as measured by patent intensity, scope, impact, generality, and originality — after controlling for country-year and industry-year fixed effects. Consistent with theories that insider trading slows innovation by impeding the valuation of innovative activities, the relationship between enforcing insider trading laws and innovation is much larger in industries that are naturally innovative and opaque, where we use the U.S. to benchmark industries.
I have often argued that divestment campaigns are fundamentally misguided. They're typically motivated by bad political ideologies, usually are ineffectual, and are bad for investors. Now there's yet more proof I'm right:
Large divestment campaigns are undertaken in part to depress share prices of firms that investors see as engaged in harmful activities. We show that, if successful, investors who divest earn lower and riskier returns than those that do not, leading them to control a decreasing share of wealth over time. Divestment therefore has only a temporary price impact. Further, we show that, for standard managerial compensation schemes, divestment campaigns actually provide an incentive for executives to increase, not reduce, the harm that they create. Therefore, divestment is both counter-productive in the short run, and self-defeating in the long run.
Davies, Shaun William and Van Wesep, Edward Dickersin, The Unintended Consequences of Divestment (August 19, 2015). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2647729