Compare and contrast:
Ertimur, Yonca, Ferri, Fabrizio and Oesch, David, Does the Director Election System Matter? Evidence from Majority Voting (May 30, 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1880974:
We examine the effect of a change in the director election system — the switch from a plurality voting standard to a more stringent standard known as majority voting (MV). Using a regression discontinuity design, we document abnormal returns of 1.43-1.60% around annual meeting dates where shareholder proposals to adopt MV are voted upon, suggesting that shareholders perceive the adoption of MV as value-enhancing. We document an increase in boards’ responsiveness to shareholders at MV firms. In particular, relative to a propensity score-matched control sample, firms adopting MV exhibit an increase in the rate of implementation of shareholder proposals supported by a majority vote and in the responsiveness to votes withheld from directors up for election. Instead, we do not find a relation between votes withheld and subsequent director turnover, regardless of the election standard. Overall, it appears that, rather than a channel to remove specific directors, director elections are viewed by shareholders as a means to obtain specific governance changes and that, in this respect, their ability to obtain such changes is stronger under a MV standard.
Sjostrom, William K. and Kim, Young Sang, Majority Voting for the Election of Directors (February 24, 2007). Connecticut Law Review, Vol. 40, No. 2, December 2007. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=962784
We explore the theory, law, and practice of the shift by public companies from a plurality voting standard for the election of directors to a majority voting standard, an emerging governance reform sweeping corporate America. Although not mandated by law, as of October 2006, more than 250 public companies, including at least 36% of S&P 500 companies and 31% of Fortune 500 companies, had implemented some form of majority voting. After analyzing the forms of majority voting implemented by these companies, we conclude that majority voting, as put into action, is little more than smoke and mirrors. We then report our findings from an event study we undertook to test our "smoke and mirrors" hypothesis. Specifically, we examined stock price movements of firms around announcements that they have or will adopt some form of majority voting. Consistent with our hypothesis, we found no statistically significant market reaction.
Empirical legal "scholarship" privileges analysis of issues that lend themselves to number crunching, but then the outcome depends on how they decide to crunch their numbers. Not my cup of tea.