I wish I found this statistic shocking:
Only 2 percent of lawsuits filed in response to M&A deals that settled in 2013 produced monetary returns for shareholders.
Meanwhile, I guess we're all supposed to be dancing in the streets because Delaware courts are not quite as liberal as they used to be in approving legal fees for plaintiffs lawyers:
The report also finds that plaintiff attorney fees awarded in disclosure-only settlements of M&A cases continued to drop in 2013. In addition, over the last four years, the Delaware Court of Chancery approved 80 percent of the fee amounts requested in such cases, compared with 90 percent in other courts.'
BFD. If plaintiff lawyers get fees in 80% of cases and plaintiffs get a monetary recovery in only 2%, well you do that math. The point is that the Delaware courts are still basically rubber stamping a system that amounts to a massive wealth transfer from investors to lawyers.
Some will ask: If derivative litigation cannot be justified on compensatory grounds, can it still be justified as a useful deterrent against managerial shirking and self-dealing? In short, no. There is no compelling evidence that derivative litigation deters a substantial amount of managerial shirking and self-dealing. Certainly there is no evidence that litigation does a better job of deterring such misconduct than do markets. There is evidence that derivative suits do not have significant effects on the stock price of the subject corporations, however, which suggests that investors do not believe derivative suits deter misconduct. There is also substantial evidence that adoption of a charter amendment limiting director liability has no significant effect on the price of the adopting corporation’s stock, which suggests that investors do not believe that duty of care liability has beneficial deterrent effects.
 See, e.g., Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care Standard in Corporate Governance, 75 Iowa L. Rev. 1 (1989); Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis, 39 Emory L.J. 1155 (1990).
 See Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 Cornell L. Rev. 261 (1986).