I've posted a new paper to SSRN -- Interest Group Analysis of Delaware Law: The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine as Case Study (January 5, 2017). UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 17-01. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2894577:
The article then turns the question of why Delaware courts have resisted adopting a more determinate standard, such as the one offered here. It argues that — at least in this context — Delaware judges are concerned neither with maximizing the number of Delaware incorporations or promoting the interests of the Delaware bar. Instead, mandatory indeterminacy with respect to corporate opportunities is driven by the Delaware courts’ self-interest in maximizing their reputation.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 25
Keywords: Corporate Opportunity Doctrine, Fiduciary Duties, Directors, Officers, Interest Groups, Indeterminacy, Judicial Incentives
JEL Classification: K22