As I anticipated, the Villanova conference has been quite interesting. One of the best papers on the first day came from my friend Tom Kohler (Boston College law). Kohler’s paper traced the evolution of the concept of solidarity in Catholic social thought (CST). Interestingly, Kohler pointed out the influence that Edmund Burke had on that process. (I should note, of course, that I may well be reading a lot into the paper that Tom did not intend. Best to say that I'm using it as a jumping off point for my own ramblings.)
I liked this paper because Burkean thinking has always struck me as having close parallels to CST. Both Burke and CST acknowledge that reason is a useful guide, but caution that it can flirt with a grave danger–namely, the triumph of individual reason. Burke contended that individual reason could never fully comprehend the divine intent, although we grope towards it through history, myth, fable, custom, and tradition. Of these, tradition and custom are by far the most important. Likewise, while Catholicism obviously draws on revealed truth, it too draws on a long history of tradition and custom.
Tradition often has a hard time withstanding the assaults of individual reason. Yet, both Burke and the Church recognize that tradition—even if seemingly foolish—has extraordinary value. We can identify at least three reasons for respecting tradition that both Burke and the Church would accept. First, tradition provides a solution for the risk of value disagreement, which modern scholars typically regard as a major problem for natural law-based jurisprudence. For such scholars, associating natural law and faith offers good grounds for being skeptical of the former. If so, however, the traditions of the community provide an alternative standard for identifying moral truths that does not require one to accept the claims of any particular faith.
Second, respect for tradition is closely linked to the virtue of prudence. Burke echoed Plato in his assertion that prudence was the statesman's chief virtue. Prudence requires a degree of consequentialist reasoning that some natural law scholars find troubling. When the question of codifying purported natural rights arises, however, attention to long-term consequences is essential. If nothing else, the law of unintended consequences must be given its due. The prudent legislator is hesitant to promulgate reforms that may give rise to new and unforeseen abuses worse than the evil to be cured. The Aristotelian virtue of prudence, of course, came into the Catholic tradition through Aquinas.
While prudence justifies reliance on empirical observations about the current state of the world, it also justifies consideration of the traditions of the community. The prudent legislator respects tradition precisely because the enduring truths of what Burke aptly called “original justice” are revealed slowly, with experience, over time. As somebody put it, providence moves slowly, but the devil always hurries. (I think it was John Randolph.) As Russell Kirk liked to say, the individual is foolish, but the species is wise. We thus turn aside from ancient usage at our peril; far better to profit from the wisdom of our forbearers.
Finally, a great virtue of tradition is that it gives us a vantage point different from today’s prevailing judgment. Individual reason in today’s moral climate too often leads to mere values, which are purely matters of personal preference, lacking the moral force to bind others. In contrast, tradition emphasizes virtue, which is backed by the sanction of an enduring moral order with real teeth. The seven cardinal virtues — justice, fortitude, prudence, temperance, faith, hope and charity — thus are not questions of personal preferences. The individual can choose not to live up to those standards, but our moral heritage treats that choice as a sin having consequences.
The function of practical reason within a moral tradition thus is not a critical one, seeking to expose the tradition’s faults, but rather a respectful one, seeking to learn what the tradition offers. (See Michael W. McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in Transforming Moral Convictions into Law, 98 Yale L.J. 1501(1989).) Burke approved of those who “instead of exploding general prejudices, employ their sagacity to discover the latent wisdom which prevails in them. If they find what they seek, and they seldom fail, they think it more wise to continue the prejudice [i.e., tradition or custom], with the reason involved, than to cast away the coat of prejudice and to leave nothing but the naked reason.” Likewise, the Catholic Encyclopedia explains that the “magisterium searches in the past, now for authorities in favour of its present thought in order to defend it against attacks or dangers of mutilation, now for light to walk the right road without straying. The thought of the Church is essentially a traditional thought and the living magisterium by taking cognizance of ancient formulas of this thought thereby recruits its strength and prepares to give to immutable truth a new expression which shall be in harmony with the circumstances of the day and within reach of contemporary minds.” The parallels are really quite striking. Perhaps the phrase “Burkean Catholic” is not quite as much of an oxymoron as some would have us believe.
