Dissident Disney investors (and former Disney directors) Roy Disney and Stanley Gold have filed suit against, among others, Walt Disney Co., the Disney board of directors, outgoing CEO Michael Eisner, and incoming CEO Bob Iger. (See NY Times article.) Disney and Gold claim that Disney's board of directors misled investors about the succession process that led to Iger's selection. Specifically, the complaint (available from SaveDisney.com) alleges that had "Disney and Gold known that the Company and a majority of the Board did not intend to stand by their public statements about engaging in a bona fide CEO selection process, [Disney and Gold] would have run an alternate slate of directors at the 2005 annual stockholders meeting." As relief they seek invalidation of the 2005 board election and new board election.
I would be very surprised if Disney and Gold received the relief they're seeking. Their fraud claim seems pretty weak - anybody who had been following events at Disney knew Iger was the frontrunner to succeed Eisner. Indeed, as I reported in September 2004, Disney and Gold were already complaining all the way back then about the prospect that Iger would succeed Eisner. The notion that the board somehow juked them out of their socks when it came time to put up or shut up is just ludicrous. (Gordon Smith seems to agree, while Larry Ribstein seems inclined to give Disney and Gold the benefit of the doubt.)
Update: With respect to the foregoing, Larry replies:
I don’t see the logic of that argument against the suit. Doesn’t it show why Disney and Gold thought it important that the board promised an open search?
Count I of the Disney-Gold complaint sounds in fiduciary duty, but is actually a nondisclosure claim. Count II of their complaint is explicitly grounded in fraud. I don't think they'll be able to prove they reasonably relied on the purported Disney board statements. How can they reasonably claim to have been defrauded when they were complaining all along about the prospect of Iger being selected?
Setting aside the merits of their claim, it's worth noting that the relief they're seeking is highly extraordinary. In public corporations, Delaware courts rarely grant equitable retrospective relief of this sort. Damages for fraud and/or breach of fiduciary duty would be far more typical.
A minor point: Larry notes that:
... it’s not clear Disney and Gold would have no claim even if they clearly wouldn’t have run an alternative slate – the shareholders might well have just voted down the incumbent slate, as they almost did before.
The problem with this argument is that Disney followed (and I believe still does so) the statutory default under which directors are elected by a mere plurality. As I've explained before, the shareholders' option to withhold authority to vote for certain candidates does not empower them to vote against those candidates. In the absence of a competing slate, a single vote for Eisner (say) would suffice for him to be elected to the board even if all the other shareholder withheld their votes from him. So I disagree that Disney and Gold have a claim absent a showing that they would have run a competing slate.
Finally, Christine Hurt uses the Disney suit to pose the following rhetorical question:
If we structure corporate law around many assumptions, including one that shareholders will monitor the board, then why are we so annoyed by large shareholders that actually do monitor?
The answer, of course, is that we do not "structure corporate law" around the assumption that shareholders will effectively monitor the board. Or, at least, I don't. As I observed in a lengthy post back in May of 2004:
Shareholders do not own the corporation. Instead, they are merely one of many corporate constituencies bound together by a complex web of explicit and implicit contracts. In this model, the directors thus are not agents of the shareholders subject to the control of the shareholders. To be sure, shareholders elect the board and exercise certain other control rights through the franchise. Yet, shareholder voting is not an integral part of the corporate decisionmaking apparatus. Although corporate law grants shareholders exclusive electoral rights, those rights are quite limited. Instead, shareholder voting is merely one accountability mechanism among many--and one to be used sparingly at that. Put another way, the board of directors functions as a sort of Platonic guardian--a sui generis body that serves as the nexus for the various contracts making up the corporation. The board's powers flow from that set of contracts in its totality and not just from shareholders. ...
The board's primacy has a compelling economic justification. The separation of ownership and control mandated by corporate law is a highly efficient solution to the decisionmaking problems faced by large corporations. Recall that because collective decisionmaking is impracticable in such firms, they are characterized by authority‑based decisionmaking structures in which a central agency (the board) is empowered to make decisions binding on the firm as a whole.
To be sure, this separation of "ownership" and control results in agency costs. Those costs, however, are the inevitable consequence of vesting discretion in someone other than the residual claimant. We could substantially reduce, if not eliminate, agency costs by eliminating discretion; that we do not do so confirms that discretion has substantial virtues. Given those virtues, one ought not lightly interfere with management or the board's decisionmaking authority in the name of accountability. Preservation of managerial discretion should always be the null hypothesis.
This line of argument explains much of corporate law. It is the principle behind such diverse doctrines as the business judgment rule, the limits on shareholder derivative litigation, the limits on shareholder voting rights, and the board's power to resist unsolicited corporate takeovers.
For a more detailed but relatively concise treatment of the issues, see my article Director v. Shareholder Primacy in the Convergence Debate