The other day I posted some ruminations on the apparent lack of leisure time available to lawyers working for big firms, citing an Economist artic le suggesting that Americans generally are enjoying more leisure time than ever. Bruce MacEwan (of the outstanding Adam Smith, Esq., blog) replied with a very thoughtful post in which he offered a very plausible explanation:
My hypothesis is that it's the product of the nasty intersection of the billable hour with increased productivity elsewhere in the economy. ... lawyers have (a) increased their hourly productivity far more slowly than the average across the economy; and (b) remain all but universally tied to the billable hour, which creates a tremendous correlation between recorded hours worked and income.
So is the answer figuring out how to significantly boost lawyer productivity and change fee structures to some flat fee/percentage of the deal system?
See also Ted Frank's thoughtful suggestion that there is a serious collective action problem in legal practice.
