Bruce Vanyo, Richard Zelichov and Christina Costley of the Katten Muchin Rosenman law firm argue that:
Nobody can accuse the plaintiff’s shareholder bar for suffering from a lack of creativity or being easily dissuaded from purporting to represent shareholders. Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”) in July 2010. Section 951 of Dodd-Frank requires a stockholder advisory vote on executive compensation (a “say-on-pay” vote). The Dodd-Frank Act, however, “specifically provides” that the say-on-pay vote (1) “shall not be binding on the issuer or the board of directors;” and (2) does not “create or imply any change to the fiduciary duties of the board members.” 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(c)). Nonetheless, the plaintiff’s bar began filing stockholder derivative lawsuits alleging breach of fiduciary duty after any negative say-on-pay vote. The vast majority of these cases have been dismissed because the plaintiff failed to make demand on the company’s board of directors before bringing suit and such See Gordon v. Goodyear, 2012 WL 2885695, *10 (N.D. Ill. July 13, 2012) (collecting cases); see also Swanson v. Weil, 2012 WL 4442795 (D. Colo. Sept. 26, 2012); Haberland v. Bulkeley, No. 5:11-CV-463-D (E.D.N.C. Sept. 26, 2012).
As a result, the plaintiff’s bar has resorted to a new attack based on a tactic developed from the merger cases: suing companies before the say-on-pay vote to enjoin the vote based on alleged misleading disclosures. In the last month or so, Plaintiffs’ shareholder lawyers have issued over 30 notices of investigation concerning such suits, and over the course of the last year, they have sued over 20 companies.
So much for the promises of the say on pay proponents that the new requirements would not become a source of revenue for the trial lawyer bar.
