Michael Greve's got a new book out, The Upside-Down Constitution, and Sandy Levinson's review makes it sound highly relevant to my debates with the crowd that wants to federalize corporate law:
[Greve] is primarily interested in what might be termed the "political economy" of federalism, by which I mean its essential role, for Greve, in liberating business from oppressive regulation by generating competition among the states to attract business (and by eliminating the ability of states that might well be reflecting the views of local communities to freeze out goods produced by companies in business-friendly states). This requires vigorous enforcement of the dormant commerce clause, on the one hand, and limitations on congressional power, on the other hand, to impose "cartelization" by a coalition of dominant states who wish to limit the autonomy of outliers. The key examples of the latter, of course, are Hammer v. Dagenhart and its overruling case of Darby Lumber. He would also happily constrain the power of states to impose punitive damages on vulnerable business. He is unabashed and admirably candid in articulating what might ne termed a "Coolidgean view" of the constitutional enterprise, by which the business of Constitutionalism is protecting business.
It sounds as though Greve's theory will provide a frame for enshrining Delaware's corporate law dominance in the Constitution, which would be useful.