Recent citations to my work

 

1.		11 Hastings Bus. L.J. 29 Hastings Business Law Journal Winter 2015 GOODWILL AND THE EXCESSES OF CORPORATE POLITICAL SPENDING David Rosenberg ...business purpose of the company as broadly as possible in order to avoid claims that certain activities are ultra vires STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, 59 60 Found. Press 2002). [FN35] . Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora's Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem ...  ...805, 812 (Del. 1984) [FN40] Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780-81 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) [FN41] See BAINBRIDGE supra note 34, at 123. [FN42] Wrigley , 237 N.E.2d at 780 [FN43] . Elhauge, supra note 12, at 776. [FN44 ...  ...accept for the corporation the highest risk adjusted returns available that are above the firm's cost of capital” See also BAINBRIDGE supra note 34, at 107. [FN51] . Larry Ribstein, Corporate Political Speech , 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV . 109, 126 (1992) Although...
2.		GATEKEEPER LIABILITY OF LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY INSIDE ATTORNEYS ““APPEARING” BEFORE THE SEC Gary O. Cohen November 12 - 14, 2014 SW003 ALI-CLE 879 Conference on Life Insurance Company Products Featuring Current SEC, FINRA, Insurance, Tax, and ERISA Regulatory and Compliance Issues The American Law Institute Continuing Legal Education ...involving accountants)(emphasis added)[hereinafter Touche Ross]. [FN119] . Villa Article, supra note 32, at 105-106 (emphasis added). [FN120] . Professor Stephen Bainbridge, Stephen Bainbridge's Journal of Law, Politics, and Culture (Oct. 4, 2011) (emphasis added), available at http:// www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2011/10/remarks-onin-house-counsel-as-gatekeepers.html(emphasis added)[hereinafter Prof. Bainbridge Remarks]. [FN121] Id. [FN122] . Prezioso Outline, supra note 5, at 6 (emphasis added). [FN123] . Rule 102(f)(2)(emphasis added  ...aff'd Weiss v. SEC, 468 F.3d 849 (D.C. Cir. 2006) available at https://www.sec.gov/info/municipal/dcccweissopinion112806.pdf. [FN137] . Prof. Bainbridge Remarks, supra note 120. [FN138] . SEC Monson Proceeding, supra note 94. [FN139] . SEC Monson Decision, supra note 18, at 5...
3.		GATEKEEPER LIABILITY OF LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY INSIDE ATTORNEYS ““APPEARING” BEFORE THE SEC-SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL Stephen L. CohenGary O. Cohen November 12 - 14, 2014 SW003 ALI-CLE 957 Conference on Life Insurance Company Products Featuring Current SEC, FINRA, Insurance, Tax, and ERISA Regulatory and Compliance Issues The American Law Institute Continuing Legal Education  ...involving accountants)(emphasis added)[hereinafter Touche Ross]. [FN119] . Villa Article, supra note 32, at 105-106 (emphasis added). [FN120] . Professor Stephen Bainbridge, Stephen Bainbridge's Journal of Law, Politics, and Culture (Oct. 4, 2011)(emphasis added), available at http:// www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2011/10/remarks-on-in-house-counsel-asgatekeepers.html (emphasis added)[hereinafter Prof. Bainbridge Remarks]. [FN121] Id. [FN122] . Prezioso Outline, supra note 5, at 6 (emphasis added). [FN123] . Rule 102(f)(2)(emphasis added  ...aff'd Weiss v. SEC, 468 F.3d 849 (D.C. Cir. 2006) available at https://www.sec.gov/info/municipal/dcccweissopinion112806.pdf. [FN137] . Prof. Bainbridge Remarks, supra note 120. [FN138] . SEC Monson Proceeding, supra note 94. [FN139] . SEC Monson Decision, supra note 18, at 5...
4.		100 Cornell L. Rev. 99 Cornell Law Review November, 2014 FINDING ORDER IN THE MORASS: THE THREE REAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL Jonathan Macey, Joshua Mitts ...we believe that our taxonomy can produce a coherent account of veil-piercing cases, and are thus more optimistic than Stephen Bainbridge, who famously called for the abolishment of the doctrine. [FN51] Unlike Bainbridge, we believe that there are strong public policy rationales for retaining veil piercing in certain situations. We hesitate to conclude ...  ...Shareholder Liability: Vicarious Tort Liability for Corporate Officers, 57 VAND. L. REV. 329, 337 (2004) [FN14] Id. at 340 [FN15] . Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L . 479, 507 (2001) [FN16] . See id. at 506-07 ; see also Frank H ...  ...frequency of and rates for veil piercing in Contract and Tort.” [FN50] . See Matheson, supra note 46, at 4. [FN51] . Bainbridge, supra note 15, at 479. [FN52] STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL (2013). [FN53] 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2012...
5.		66 Fla. L. Rev. 2179 Florida Law Review November, 2014 SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS IN THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE INFLUENCE Paul Rose  ...proponents of shareholder primacy. Director primacy is not wholly compatible with agency models of the shareholder-director relationship. As Professor Stephen Bainbridge puts it, directorial power is “sui generis”; directors may be elected by shareholders, but they are not mere agents of ...  ...2013) [FN14] . Paul Rose, Common Agency and the Public Corporation, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 1355, 1359 (2010) [FN15] . See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 547, 550 (2003) [FN16] . See id ...  ...will not question the rational business judgments made by directors, corporate boards should nonetheless “ultimately promote stockholder value”). [FN21] . See Bainbridge, supra note 15, at 560. [FN22] Id. at 563-65 [FN23] . See id. at 567 [FN24] Id. at 563-65 [FN25] . Rose, supra note 14, at 1364-65. [FN26] . See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law, Reg., Spring 2003, at 26, 26. [FN27] . See infra Part IV. [FN28] . Elizabeth Garrett...
6.		99 Minn. L. Rev. 27 Minnesota Law Review November, 2014 A CORPORATE RIGHT TO PRIVACY Elizabeth Pollman  ...a discussion of the roles of directors and officers, see KLEIN ET AL., supra note 163, at 116, 135-37; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance , 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 5 (2002) ; Donald C. Langevoort, The Human...
7.		48 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 271 U.C. Davis Law Review November, 2014 THE (UN)ENFORCEMENT OF CORPORATE OFFICERS' DUTIES Megan W. Shaner  ...228 229 240 249 274 available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2003-04-16/pdf/03-9157.pdf; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance , 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 559-60, 605-06 (2003) [hereinafter The Means and Ends ]; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment , 119 HARV. L. REV . 1735, 1735-36 (2006) [hereinafter Shareholder Disempowerment [FN3] See DEL . C ODE ... ...78o and 18 U.S.C. § 1350 ) (addressing auditors, audit committees, officer certification, prohibition on loans to officers and financial reports); STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (2012) (discussing corporate governance following the financial crisis); ABA Report supra , at 107 (noting ... ...a result of federal preemption. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition , 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 600 (2003) see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law REG ., Spring 2003, at 26, 31 (asserting that the “substance of corporate governance standards...
8.		48 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 337 U.C. Davis Law Review November, 2014 AGAINST CONFIDENTIALITY Dru Stevenson  ...that mandatory disclosure “equalizes information asymmetries, thereby enhancing settlement prospects and also reducing surprises and gamesmanship at trial.” [FN6] See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship 82 CORNELL L. REV . 856, 869 n.53..