In “Seeking a Cure for Raging Corporate Activism,” published on March 17, 2015, in the WSJ, the author discusses a technique resurrected from the 1980’s that could, on reexamination, be “a bulwark against short-termers who roam the markets, looking to force buybacks or an untimely company sale.” Known as “tenure voting,” the concept would give investors additional votes if they hold their shares for at least a specified period of time, thus rewarding long-term holders by giving them more say in the future of the company than say, short-term hedge fund activists that may favor short-term profits over long-term business strategies.
The author notes a number of problems with actually implementing this proposal, to which I would add the stock exchange one vote/one share listing standards, about which I have written occasionally, principally in The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 19c-4. Washington University Law Quarterly, Vol. 69, Pp. 565-634, 1991. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=315375
