Chevron deference --> Chevron --> Oil --> Russia --> KGB --> Putin. Q.E.D. https://t.co/rEVn6zr0B2
— Andy Grewal (@AndyGrewal) February 1, 2017
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Chevron deference --> Chevron --> Oil --> Russia --> KGB --> Putin. Q.E.D. https://t.co/rEVn6zr0B2
— Andy Grewal (@AndyGrewal) February 1, 2017
Posted at 05:59 PM in SCOTUS and Con Law | Permalink
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Round 1: The next to the latest in an ongoing series of mass emails sent around the UCLAW system inviting people to join one or another of the mass letters signed by hundreds or thousands of legal academics in opposition to some policy or another of President Trump.
Round 2: I post my thoughts on why Congress should ignore those sort of letters here, but I don't get into it via email.
Round 3: The latest in the ongoing series goes out by email from the same sender.
Round 4: I post a second time about the matter and this time send out an email that asked, I thought very politely, "Kindly remove me from this email distribution list."
Round 5: The same sender sends out a third email:
Dear Colleagues,
On a lighter(?) note, I want to recommend that you see “Breaking News: Turning the Lens on the Media” at the Getty Center, which begins with a room devoted to photos by our colleague Grace Blumberg’s husband Donald of the news (from newspapers and television) in the 1960s. It’s a wonderful show and properly introduced by his provocative photographs.
I also want to reject Steven Bainbridge’s request to be removed from list (which actually is impossible, at least for a technophobe like me). I believe the essence of collegiality in an academic community is the exchange of views. Obviously, no one has to engage in this process and is free not to read. But no one should be excluded. I believe that use of the Faculty Distribution List to discuss the impact of Donald Trump’s executive orders on the law school and the larger academic community is entirely proper.
As someone who suffers from chronic misspellings and typos myself, I pass over the misspelling of my name. But really, how hard is it to set up an email distribution list?
In any case, that led to....
Round 6: At this point, I must admit that I am starting to enjoy myself. So I sent out this email to the faculty (in case it wasn't obvious, all of this is taking place via the faculty email distribution list):
If Professor [redacted] thinks the email exchange list is the correct place to exchange views, perhaps I should avail myself of this opportunity to express my views on this one occasion despite my general views about using law school emails for this purpose:
One of my colleagues set around this email today:
Dear Colleagues,
I hope you will look at the letter from the link below and consider signing on. Several of our colleagues have already done so. Among Trump’s Cabinet nominations, Puzder must rank as one of the worst.
Thanks for listening.
Thanks again so much for signing our national law student and faculty sign-on letter opposing Puzder's nomination.
Resisting Injustice & Standing for Equality (RISE), a new law student organization started by NYU Law students, is spearheading a national law student and faculty sign-on letter opposing the nomination of CKE Restaurants CEO Andrew Puzder for Secretary of Labor. The letter will be sent to the members of the Senate Health, Education, Labor & Pensions Committee, whose hearing on the nomination is set for February 2. It explains (with citations) why Puzder's history and views would make him a Secretary who is actively hostile to working people.
They already have over 780 signatures from students and faculty representing over 100 schools, and we are hoping to grow even further.
Please take a moment to read the letter. Then click here to add your name. (Affiliations will be listed for identification purposes only.)
They would also appreciate if you could take the time to forward this to three colleagues, including one at another law school.
It's bad enough to get this sort of unsolicited mass liberal spam from outside circles, but to have's own colleague cluttering up one's email folders with it is most annoying. (Not to mention the use of state- and tuition-funded law school email for political purposes generally.)
More generally, however, I deplore this sort of letter campaign anyway. The implicit claim of these letters is that the signatories are experts with special knowledge that makes their opinion more valuable than, say, the "deplorables" who voted for Trump. But notice that the sender sent it to everybody on the law school distribution list. Most of the recipients know about as much about labor law and Andy Puzder as, well, I do. Which hovers somewhere between nada and zilch. But that hasn't deter countless law professors from signing.
When a similar mass letter was signed by over 1,000 law professors in opposition to Jeff Sessions' nomination as Attorney General, John O. McGinnis aptly wrote that:
Of course, these law professors have every right to oppose Jeff Sessions as citizens, but they are clearly here writing as legal scholars, noting their position as law professors at the start of the letter and signing with their institutional affiliations.
What is notable, however, is the lack of any scholarly argument in the letter. There is no analysis of why Sessions’ positions are wrong as matter of law or policy. I doubt many of the signers have examined the hearings for his district court nomination to come to independent judgment on his fitness for that office or any other.
Law professors have been writing such letters of mass advice to Congress for some time. They are almost always letters supporting the left-liberal positions, because law professors are overwhelmingly left liberal. Neal Devins of William and Mary has made a powerful case that these letters are a serious mistake, because they attempt to trade on law professors’ status as scholars to give credibility to unscholarly and sometimes partisan advice. Professor Devins has noted that many law professors who sign these letters lack scholarly expertise in the subject matter, and this letter is no different in that respect. But even the letters he critiqued, like that contending that President Clinton’s impeachment was unconstitutional, had at least the patina of an argument. But this letter just takes positions without serious reasoning of the kind scholars provide.
As such, this letter debases the enterprise of scholarship. What we as scholars can provide to politicians is more articulate reasons for political action. That deepening of deliberation does a service to democratic debate, which at its best is about reason, not raw preferences. Particularly in these days where politics is less and less about policy and more about loyalties to one’s tribe, scholars have a particular obligation to raise politics toward the ideal of reason rather than to lower scholarly discourse toward that of coarse politics.
David French similarly observed:
I’m curious — given that the letter touches on everything from climate change to immigration policy, what exactly are the scientific, economic, and national security credentials of the signatories? Can they speak to the impact of immigration on working-class wages? Are they authorities on the precise relationship between fossil fuels and climate, including on the relative effectiveness of Obama-era EPA actions? And if there are actual examples of in-person voter fraud, is it still a “myth?”
What’s actually happening is that a collection of liberals are using the (rapidly-diminishing) prestige of their institutions and profession to make news when there is none. Of course liberals oppose a conservative nominee, and of course academic liberals are prone to play the race card. If any of them wish to make a detailed case based on law and facts, then make that case. Until then, however, their letter is little more than an especially pretentious version of a Change.org petition.
And, last but definitely not least, I invoke the great corporate law scholar, Stephen Presser, who was prompted to pen an oped for the Chicago Tribune, appropriately headlined Sen. Sessions and the Smug Self-Satisfaction of the Law Professoriate:
The first striking thing about the recent letter signed by 1,100 law professors urging the U.S. Senate not to confirm attorney general nominee Sen. Jeff Sessions, R-Ala., is its extraordinary arrogance and presumption. What makes such a huge gaggle of academics so sure that 1) the Senate is incapable of determining on its own the qualifications of Sessions for a Cabinet position, and 2) What makes them think they know more than senators?
What, indeed.
If Congress has any sense (and, since there is a GOP majority, it does), it will simply ignore these sorts of letters.
Several colleagues have sent along quite nice notes of support via email, for which I thank them. As yet, no commentary from the left side of the faculty.
I await Round 7 with interest. Join the meanwhile, I have to go to my Catholic doctrine class.
Posted at 05:04 PM in Law School | Permalink
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From Susan Sarandon's Twitter feed:
Goodbye @Uber. Hello @lyft. #DeleteUber pic.twitter.com/Hk04FpllUn
— Susan Sarandon (@SusanSarandon) January 30, 2017
The switch was prompted by this email that (I assume) all Lyft users (including yours truly) received today:
Many of my friends in the corporate law academy (and elsewhere, for that matter) are deeply supportive of corporate social responsibility and deeply suspicious of corporate use of funds to advance a political agenda. So I wonder how they will approach the Lyft ad? Is it being socially responsible? Presumably they'll say yes and with enthusiasm, even though the email arguably misdescribes the executive order in a number of respects. (For a sensible substantive analysis of the order, go here.)
But if they are okay with spending corporate money to advance this political agenda (if that is what it is)? If so, aren't they really saying that corporate political spending only offends them when it advances causes with which they disagree?
Personally, I don't have a problem with Lyft's email. I am a regular Lyft user and will remain so. Why? because I think Lyft's action makes perfect sense from a profit-maximizing perspective.
The bulk of Lyft's business is conducted in large coastal cities. In other words, Obama/Clinton country. By engaging in blatant virtue signaling, which it had to know would generate untold millions of dollars worth of free coverage when social media and the news picked the story up, Lyft is very cheaply buying "advertising" that will effectively appeal to its big city/blue state user base.
And then Lyft got an even bigger favor when Uber failed to follow suit:
Lyft's biggest competitor, Uber, has not done itself any favors either, as the company did not join a wider JFK airport taxi ban meant to protest the Trump order. As a result, the hashtag #DeleteUber was trending on Twitter yesterday.
Over on that social network, some loyal Uber users are vowing to switch to Lyft as a result of the generosity. In other words, while the donation was not necessarily meant to be a means of advertising, the kind gesture could be a boost for the Lyft brand.
"Not necessarily means to be a means of advertising"? if not, Lyft's managers are a lot dumber than I give them credit for being.
Lastly, all this brings to mind an empirical question for which I have been able to find an answer: Is Uber's user base more evenly distributed across red and blue states than Lyft? And, if so, will Uber take that into account?
Posted at 12:53 PM in Corporate Social Responsibility | Permalink
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So this turned into an all-day project, but a fun one.
Season oxtails on all sides with salt and pepper. Brown on all sides in a large skillet over medium heat. Transfer to your trusty Cuisinart slow cooker. Add a couple of teaspoons of olive oil to the pan, return it to the heat, season with salt and pepper, and sauté until vegetables turn translucent and are just beginning to brown at the edges. Add vegetables to slow cooker. Deglaze the pan with wine and reduce by half. Add wine, broths, sauces, and bay leaf. Set to high. Cook for 4-5 hours.
Remove oxtails from slow cooker. Pour the broth through a fine mesh sieve into a clean container. Transfer broth to a fat separator, cover with plastic wrap, and refrigerate. (Discard vegetables)
Once oxtails have cooled, remove and shred the meat. Put the meat in a glass bowl with a cover and refrigerate. Discard bones.
Sauté pancetta in a non-stick skillet until it begins to brown and has rendered its fat. Add leeks. Sauté until they begin to wilt and take on some color. Add mushrooms and sauté for about 6-8 minutes or until they are soft and have given up all their liquid. Add garlic and season with salt, pepper, a pinch or two of Italian herbs. Sauté for about 45 seconds. Transfer to glass bowl with the meat.
Meanwhile, reconstitute 1 ounce porcini mushrooms in hot water. Drain, rinse, and chop into medium dice. Add to glass bowl.
Meanwhile, bring a pot of water seasoned with salt to the boil. Cook 10-12 or so baby potatoes and 1 carrot cut into quarter-inch coins for about 15 minutes. Drain and add to glass bowl. Add 1 tablespoon of Wondra to glass bowl and mix thoroughly.
About 30 minutes before dinner pour the stock off the fat into a large pot, discarding the latter. Bring to a boil. Add contents of glass bowl. Stir and reduce heat to a low simmer.Top with fresh chives and serve.
To drink I poured a Beringer Private Reserve Cabernet Sauvignon (Napa Valley) 2002. On decanting off moderate sediment, it showed a lovely ruby with just the slightest hint of brick at the very edge. The bouquet suggested blackberry, black cherry, and blackcurrant, with a dash of leather and cedar. Ditto the palate. Soft smooth tannins. Drink now. Grade: 93
PS: I can't figure out why TypePad insists on rotating the image. Grumble.
Posted at 07:49 PM in Food and Wine | Permalink
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The other day, I blogged about the absurd series of mass letters from law professors being cobbled together to oppose some policy of another of the new administration. (Here) As I observed in more detail over there, these mass letters purport to invoke our expertise as legal scholars but in fact most of the signers are not experts in the relevant field. The letters really have no more validity than an online petition. So I finally got mad enough to fire off an email demanding to be removed from the distribution list for the emails soliciting signatures for these absurd letters.
Dear Colleagues,
Please consider signing this letter against Trump’s EO on immigration.
Thanks for your time.
Sincerely,
[redacted]
From: Law of Torture [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Gabor Rona
Sent: Saturday, January 28, 2017 9:07 AM
To: [email protected]
Subject: [WWS-TORTURELIST] Academics Against Immigration Executive Order: Sign-on letter
Copy of letter with initial signatories: https://sites.google.com/view/notoimmigrationeo/home
Posted at 02:34 PM in Law School | Permalink
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Francis Pileggi and Anne Tucker offer useful analyses of Andersen v. Mattel, Inc., C.A. No. 11816-VCMR (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 2017). As Pileggi explains:
The Court provides a useful recitation of standards that are of widespread applicability to those who make their living engaged in corporate litigation. For example, the court explained the following well-settled principles:
- By making a pre-suit demand, a plaintiff concedes that the board is disinterested and independent for purposes of responding to the demand. (This imposes at the outset quite a barrier to overcome in the likely event that, as here, the board refuses the demand.)
- Thus, the board’s decision is subject to the business judgment rule, and the only issue for the court to address in this context in order to analyze whether the board’s refusal was proper is: “the good faith and reasonableness of its [the board’s] investigation.” See footnote 21.
What I have never quite understood about this issue is the odd way the courts phrase the relevant standard:
[T]o survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 23.1 where demand has been made and refused, a plaintiff must allege particularized facts that raise a reasonable doubt that (1) the board’s decision to deny the demand was consistent with its duty of care to act on an informed basis, that is, was not grossly negligent; or (2) the board acted in good faith, consistent with its duty of loyalty. Otherwise, the decision of the board is entitled to deference as a valid exercise of its business judgment.
This is parallel to the standard for demand excusal, of course, which provides that:
[T]he Court of Chancery in the proper exercise of its discretion must decide whether, under the particularized facts alleged, a reasonable doubt is created that: (1) the directors are disinterested and independent and (2) the challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a valid exercise of business judgment. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del.1984).
I share Judge Frank Easterbrook's skepticism about the "reasonable doubt" language:
The reference to “reasonable doubt” summons up the standard applied in criminal law. It is a demanding standard, meaning at least a 90% likelihood that the defendant is guilty. If “reasonable doubt” in the Aronson formula means the same thing as “reasonable doubt” in criminal law, then demand is excused whenever there is a 10% chance that the original transaction is not protected by the business judgment rule. Why should demand be excused on such a slight showing? Surely not because courts want shareholders to file suit whenever there is an 11% likelihood that the business judgment rule will not protect a transaction. Aronson did not say, and later cases have not supplied the deficit. If “reasonable doubt” in corporate law means something different from “reasonable doubt” in criminal law, however, what is the difference?, and why use the same term for two different things? Starrels v. First Nat’l Bank of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1168, 1175 (7th Cir.1989) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
The Delaware Supreme Court eventually provided some guidance by suggesting that “the concept of reasonable doubt is akin to the concept that the stockholder has a ‘reasonable belief’ that the board lacks independence or that the transaction was not protected by the business judgment rule.” Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1217 (Del.1996).
But why not just ditch the phrase all together?
Posted at 02:04 PM in Corporate Law | Permalink
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As previously noted, I'm enrolled in Notre Dame's STEP program and currently taking the Core Course: Introduction to the Catholic Faith. This week's assignment contained a number of readings on catholic understanding of Scripture and Tradition and then tasked us to answer the question "What is meant by the term, 'Inspiration'? Would you say that everything in the Bible is true?" in 150-200 words. I managed to stop myself at 197.
As I understand the term, “inspired” does not even remotely mean “dictated.” Instead, it means that the Holy Spirit brought concepts and ideas to the minds of the authors (illuminating revelation), prodded the author to write, and helped call to mind felicitous phrasing.
As Catholics, we believe that inerrancy follows inevitably from inspiration. The Catechism says “The inspired books teach the truth.” (¶ 107)
But there are many kinds of truth. In the parable of the mustard seed, Jesus compares the Kingdom of God to a “mustard seed,” which He said was “the smallest of all the seeds, yet when full-grown it is the largest of plants.” (Matt. 13:31-32) A botanist would tell us that there are smaller seeds and larger plants, so the statement is not literally true in the scientific sense.
But the mustard seed was the smallest seed of which 1st century Jews in Israel knew, so the analogy aided them in understanding that the Kingdom of God starts very small and becomes very large. In that sense, the parable is morally true.
Discerning the genre of the specific passage is thus the first step in discerning the way in which it is true.
This week's online class discussion raised some interesting issues:
My class on Catholic doctrine is having an interesting discussion of whether the Biblical canon is fixed for all time. @wrdcsc @FrMatthewLC
— Professor Bainbridge (@ProfBainbridge) January 24, 2017
@wrdcsc @FrMatthewLC some of the class contend an ecumenical council could add new books. I thought Trent said the canon was permanent.
— Professor Bainbridge (@ProfBainbridge) January 24, 2017
@wrdcsc @FrMatthewLC And now we're on to whether there are really just 2 infallible teachings. Status of Magisterium?
— Professor Bainbridge (@ProfBainbridge) January 24, 2017
Posted at 03:56 PM in Religion | Permalink
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In Stone v. Ritter,[1] shareholders of AmSouth Bancorporation brought a derivative suit against AmSouth’s directors alleging a “classic Caremark claim.” In 2004, AmSouth had paid $50 million in fines and penalties to the federal government to settle criminal and civil charges that the bank had failed to file reports of suspicious activity required by the federal anti-money-laundering regulations. The plaintiffs thereafter brought a derivative claim, seeking to recover the $50 million from the directors. Plaintiffs alleged that “defendants had utterly failed to implement any sort of statutorily required monitoring, reporting or information controls that would have enabled them to learn of problems requiring their attention.”
In Stone, the Delaware supreme court confirmed that “Caremark articulates the necessary conditions for assessing director oversight liability.” In doing so, however, the court described Caremark as a case in which the operative standards are good faith and loyalty rather than care, stating that:
[T]he Caremark standard for so-called “oversight” liability draws heavily upon the concept of director failure to act in good faith. That is consistent with the definition(s) of bad faith recently approved by this Court in its recent Disney decision, where we held that a failure to act in good faith requires conduct that is qualitatively different from, and more culpable than, the conduct giving rise to a violation of the fiduciary duty of care (i.e., gross negligence). In Disney, we identified the following examples of conduct that would establish a failure to act in good faith: . . . where the fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties.
Stone further held that “In the absence of red flags, good faith in the context of oversight must be measured by the directors’ actions to assure a reasonable information and reporting system exists and not by second-guessing after the occurrence of employee conduct that results in an unintended adverse outcome.”
Liability will arise only where there are alleged “red flags” that are “either waved in one’s face or displayed so that they are visible to the careful observer.” Rattner v. Bidzos, 2003 WL 22284323 at 13 (Del. Ch. 2003), quoting In re Citigroup Inc. S’holders Litig., 2003 WL 21384599, at *2 (Del. Ch. 2003).
Which raises the question: What's the difference between a red flag that can result in liability if ignored and a yellow flag that cannot?
Friend of the blog prominent Delaware corporate lawyer Francis Pileggi recently posted an essay, Court Explains Directors Fiduciary Duty of Oversight, which discusses a recent Delaware Chancery Court case, Reiter v. Fairbank, and provides a valuable overview of the law in this area.
Pileggi explains:
In Reiter v. Fairbank, the Delaware Court of Chancery reasoned that there was no key event or document that constituted a red flag to the board. At most, there were a number of yellow flags that the board adequately addressed.
He goes on to discuss the yellow flags and why they were yellow rather than red.
[1] 911 A.2d 362 (Del.2006).
Posted at 10:40 AM in Corporate Law | Permalink
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As previously noted, I'm enrolled in Notre Dame's STEP program and currently taking the Core Course: Introduction to the Catholic Faith:
In the documents of Vatican II, the baptized are called to holiness and to greater understanding of their unique role in building the Kingdom of God. An informational and enriching introduction to the Catholic faith and theology, this course will enable you to take greater responsibility in promoting the life and mission of the Church. Using the United States Catholic Catechism for Adults as a primary text, this course will explore six core areas and will serve as a good foundation for those who seek to continue theological studies or develop theological competency for ministry. Theology is a fascinating and vital subject that challenges those who study it to think critically and personally about human existence, the world we live in and our relationship with God and one another. It is recommended (but not required) as a first course for those new to theological study.
Week 1's topic is faith development. The weekly assignment was to write 150-200 words on the question "How is faith both a gift and a human act?" As regular readers might expect, my weekly comment ran a bit long. Don't expect anything terribly profound. It's just my musing on the assigned topic:
In creating man and woman, God endowed us all with a yearning for the infinite. As the quotation from St Augustine reminds us, “Our heart is restless until it rests in you.”
Yet, on our own, we grope toward knowledge of God feebly and imperfectly. And so another step in the process by which God gives us faith is Revelation of himself.
God reveals himself to all through creation. “The heavens declare the glory of God; the firmament proclaims the works of his hands. Day unto day pours forth speech; night unto night whispers knowledge.” (Ps 19:2-3).
God most fully reveals himself in scripture. God inspired the prophets, apostles, and others who wrote the bible to provide a true account of God’s revealed nature. God granted insight to the Church Fathers who determined the canon of Holy Scripture, separating the wheat from the chaff, and thus giving us a rich foundation of revealed truth upon which to construct out faith. And, of course, the Church has built the Magisterium upon that foundation as God continues to reveal himself to the saints and scholars of the Church who grapple with how the eternal truths of scripture apply to an ever-changing world.
Yet, faith must also be a human act. If God granted justification to an elect few—if he predestined some for salvation and some for damnation—there would be no free will.
God invites us to join his company. Some (we may hope many or even most) will accept the gift he offers. In doing so, they complete the act of faith. There has been a proffered gift and a freely given acceptance thereof.
We may think of this as faith rather than knowledge, for faith is defined as “is the realization of what is hoped for and evidence of things not seen.” (Heb. 11:1). Unlike St. Thomas, who believed only after seeing the nail marks on Jesus and the hole in his side, we who have faith are blessed because we “have not seen and have believed” anyway. (John 20:29)
Posted at 10:26 AM in Religion | Permalink
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I've enrolled in the University of Notre Dame's Satellite Theological Education Program (STEP) to pursue their Certificate in Doctrine. The STEP program is an online educational program:
We use digital technology to offer theological education to pastoral ministers and other adult Catholics across the United States and beyond. We are part of Notre Dame's McGrath Institute for Church Life, which serves the University's larger mission of teaching, research, and service to society and to the Church.
Our staff members work with Notre Dame professors and other highly qualified instructors to assemble lectures, readings, and supporting materials for Web-based courses. We train and coordinate facilitators, who in turn guide STEP students as they interact with each other and with Notre Dame's online learning environment. From registration to course completion, we strive to provide you with a friendly, supportive place to grow in faith and understanding.
STEP Certificates of Catholic Theology recognize those who have completed a set of courses and a final assignment in a given area of theological study. A Certificate of Catholic Theology may enable you to:
Demonstrate competence in a given theological discipline.
Meet diocesan or national certification standards for the intellectual dimension of faith formation for diaconate or lay ecclesial ministry.
Certificates of Catholic Theology are available for the following areas of study: Doctrine, History, Liturgy, and Scripture.
The Certificate in Doctrine requires the following courses:
I'm currently enrolled in the Core Course. At the end of each week, we have to post a short discussion of the topic for that week. It's supposed to be 150-200 words. As you can imagine, that's a real problem for me. My week 1 post ran 350 words. Anyway, I plan to cross post my weekly comments here.
Posted at 10:21 AM in Religion | Permalink
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A former student is starting her career as a corporate law associate and asked my advice on some books she could valuably read to prepare:
Every business lawyer must read: The Terrible Truth About Lawyers by Mark H. McCormack https://t.co/0btjj7oYaS
— Professor Bainbridge (@ProfBainbridge) January 16, 2017
Highly recommended for starting lawyers: Drafting for Corporate Finance: What Law School Didn't Teach You https://t.co/O6rAJRRAbX
— Professor Bainbridge (@ProfBainbridge) January 16, 2017
I highly recommend: Corporate Director's Guidebook by ABA Business Law Section https://t.co/Kuz5ZDN91d via @amazon
— Professor Bainbridge (@ProfBainbridge) January 16, 2017
Recommended for deep pockets: Securities Law and Practice Deskbook https://t.co/UASts68mGD via @amazon
— Professor Bainbridge (@ProfBainbridge) January 16, 2017
And, of course, I recommend: Corporate Law (Concepts and Insights) by Stephen Bainbridge https://t.co/Yo28uwSKDU via @amazon
— Professor Bainbridge (@ProfBainbridge) January 16, 2017
Posted at 12:04 PM in Books | Permalink
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Let's get the usual disclaimers out of the way. As a practicing Catholic, I give religious assent to the Magisterium of the Church and all due respect to the Bishops thereof. Yet, I also note that the church encourages lay initiative “especially when the matter involves discovering or inventing the means for permeating social, political, and economic realities with the demands of Christian doctrine and life.” United States Catholic Conference, Catechism of the Catholic Church ¶ 899 (2d ed. 1997).
The Institute for Policy Research & Catholic Studies at The Catholic University of America (which I think is fairly described as left leaning) recently held a conference at which San Diego Bishop Robert McElroy gave a keynote address. There is much in Bishop McElroy's address that is worthy of comment and I likely will have more to say about it in the future. In this post, however, I want to focus on his call for the Church to stand in solidarity with public employee unions:
One of the lynchpins of the tradition of Catholic teaching on economic justice is that the right to workers' associations is not only an essential element of obtaining justice for the workers themselves, but that it also contributes to the common good of society as a whole. There is no doubt that there will be further attacks upon the rights of public sector unions to exist and seek justice for their members in the coming years. And while the duty of all unions to seek the common good of society as a whole presents special obligations for public workers, all of the fundamental principles of Catholic social teaching which have enshrined the right to organize and bargain collectively at the very heart of the church's social doctrine testify equally to the right of public sector workers to obtain justice in pay, benefits and working conditions through robust unions.
The highlighted passage calls to mind Harry Truman's famous plea: "Give me a one-handed Economist. All my economists say 'on hand...', then 'but on the other...” On the one hand, Bishop McElroy gives (dare I say grudging) recognition of the special problems created by public sector unionism. On the other hand, he also gives (may I say full throated) support for the principle of pubic sector unionism.
I have no quarrel with the longstanding tradition in Catholic Social Thought (CST) of support for private sector unionism. It figured in the Pope Leo XIII's foundational encyclical Rerum Novarum:
We may lay it down as a general and lasting law that working men's associations should be so organized and governed as to furnish the best and most suitable means for attaining what is aimed at, that is to say, for helping each individual member to better his condition to the utmost in body, soul, and property.
One hundred years later, the great Pope John Paul II reaffirmed in Centesimus Annus that:
Pope Leo XIII's Encyclical also affirms other rights as inalienable and proper to the human person. Prominent among these, because of the space which the Pope devotes to it and the importance which he attaches to it, is the "natural human right" to form private associations. This means above all the right to establish professional associations of employers and workers, or of workers alone.19 Here we find the reason for the Church's defence and approval of the establishment of what are commonly called trade unions: certainly not because of ideological prejudices or in order to surrender to a class mentality, but because the right of association is a natural right of the human being, which therefore precedes his or her incorporation into political society. Indeed, the formation of unions "cannot ... be prohibited by the State", because "the State is bound to protect natural rights, not to destroy them; and if it forbids its citizens to form associations, it contradicts the very principle of its own existence".
As I read the relevant papal encyclicals, which form the core of CST, however, the unions at issue typically are understood as associations of workers employed by private--especially industrial--enterprise. Even in that context, moreover, the encyclicals recognize that the right of free association must be balanced against the public good. In discussing the right to strike in Laborem Exercens, for example, John Paul II wrote that:
While admitting that it is a legitimate means, we must at the same time emphasize that a strike remains, in a sense, an extreme means. It must not be abused; it must not be abused especially for "political" purposes. Furthermore it must never be forgotten that, when essential community services are in question, they must in every case be ensured, if necessary by means of appropriate legislation. Abuse of the strike weapon can lead to the paralysis of the whole of socioeconomic life, and this is contrary to the requirements of the common good of society, which also corresponds to the properly understood nature of work itself.
Public sector unionism in fact poses a direct and inescapable threat to the common good of society in a way that private unions simps do not.
As Daniel DiSalvo writes, leading labor and political figures long recognized that public sector unions were a bad idea:
Prior to the 1950s, as labor lawyer Ida Klaus remarked in 1965, "the subject of labor relations in public employment could not have meant less to more people, both in and out of government." To the extent that people thought about it, most politicians, labor leaders, economists, and judges opposed collective bargaining in the public sector. Even President Franklin Roosevelt, a friend of private-sector unionism, drew a line when it came to government workers: "Meticulous attention," the president insisted in 1937, "should be paid to the special relations and obligations of public servants to the public itself and to the Government....The process of collective bargaining, as usually understood, cannot be transplanted into the public service." The reason? F.D.R. believed that "[a] strike of public employees manifests nothing less than an intent on their part to obstruct the operations of government until their demands are satisfied. Such action looking toward the paralysis of government by those who have sworn to support it is unthinkable and intolerable." Roosevelt was hardly alone in holding these views, even among the champions of organized labor. Indeed, the first president of the AFL-CIO, George Meany, believed it was "impossible to bargain collectively with the government."
He further explains that:
In 1943, a New York Supreme Court judge held:
To tolerate or recognize any combination of civil service employees of the government as a labor organization or union is not only incompatible with the spirit of democracy, but inconsistent with every principle upon which our government is founded. Nothing is more dangerous to public welfare than to admit that hired servants of the State can dictate to the government the hours, the wages and conditions under which they will carry on essential services vital to the welfare, safety, and security of the citizen. To admit as true that government employees have power to halt or check the functions of government unless their demands are satisfied, is to transfer to them all legislative, executive and judicial power. Nothing would be more ridiculous.
The very nature of many public services — such as policing the streets and putting out fires — gives government a monopoly or near monopoly; striking public employees could therefore hold the public hostage. As long-time New York Times labor reporter A. H. Raskin wrote in 1968: "The community cannot tolerate the notion that it is defenseless at the hands of organized workers to whom it has entrusted responsibility for essential services."
A core problem with public sector unionism is that it creates a uniquely powerful interest group. In theory, bureaucrats are supposed to work for and be accountable to the elected representatives of the people. But suppose those bureaucrats organize into large, well-funded, powerful unions that can tip election results. With very few and very unique exceptions, no workplace in which the employees elect the supervisors functions well for long. Yet, research by Terry Moe (22 J.L. Econ. & Org. 1) into the electoral power of teachers' unions finds just such an outcome:
The first study ... provides evidence that teachers, acting through their unions, are quite successful at getting their favored candidates elected to local school boards. When a candidate is supported by the unions, her probability of winning increases dramatically, so much so that the impact of union support appears to be roughly the same as the impact of incumbency. In terms of total impact, union influence may be even greater than this suggests, because union victories literally produce incumbents—and the power of incumbency then works for union candidates to boost their probability of victory still further in future elections.
The second study ... shows that public bureaucrats' turnout advantage over other citizens is much greater than the existing literature would lead us to expect. It also offers persuasive new grounds for believing that their high turnout is indeed motivated by occupational self-interest—and more generally, that they are actively and purposely engaged in an electoral effort to control their own superiors.
Moe concludes:
The prevailing theories treat bureaucrats as mere subordinates, controlled from above by political authorities. But the control relationship can run both ways, and not just because bureaucrats have expertise and other sources of private information. In a democratic system the authorities are elected, and this gives bureaucrats an opportunity to exercise electoral power in determining who will occupy positions of authority and what choices they will make in office. It would be odd indeed if public bureaucrats and their unions did not invest in this kind of reverse control—and there is ample evidence that they do.
In effect, public sector unionism thus means that representatives of the union will often be on both sides of the collective bargaining table. On the one side, the de jure union leaders. On the other side, the bought and paid for politicians. No wonder public sector union wages and benefits are breaking the back of state budgets. They are bargaining with themselves rather than with an arms'-length opponent.
Even if the public's representatives at the collective bargaining table are not de facto union representatives, the nature of public sector collective bargaining inherently leads to inefficiencies. As far back as 1971, in their book The Unions and the Cities, Harry Wellington and Ralph Winter argued that "there are sound reasons for concluding that government is not just another industry" (Book Review, 13 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.):
Foremost of these reasons is the unreliability of transplanting the private sector labor legislation's operating assumption that the employer's superior bargaining power should be equalized. That power in a given city may already be equal or tipped in favor of public employee unions due to the very nature of the public employer who, unlike the private employer, is not subject to market restraints but is subject to political restraints. Government decisions are properly political decisions and economic considerations, although para- mount to the private employer, are but one criterion among many for the public employer. Market restraints in the private sector are such that increased benefits will cause higher prices for the employer's product which in turn, in a system of tradeoffs, causes possible unemployment of some employees. No such market restraint exists in the public sector except in theory since discharging teachers, sanitation workers, or police- men as a result of granting higher benefits raises very real political pressures from within the affected government department and from an inconvenienced public. Government employers too frequently yield to constituents by a grant of increased benefits to employees and then either bury the increases in the "bowels of an incomprehensible municipal budget," seek new funds, or reduce other services by reallocating the city's treasury. Thus, normal market restraints are often supplanted by political restraints regardless of economic or social impact. ...
Add to this political power of public employee unions the private sector strike weapon and they may have, argue the authors, a disproportionate quantum of power sufficient to distort the normal political process. Their power may be so effective a means of redistributing income that they will have "an institutionalized means of obtaining and maintaining a subsidy for union members."
In sum, public sector unionism lacks the moral and economic justifications for private sector unionism. It results in significant distortions of the political process, which have real adverse consequences for the taxpayers.
Indeed, consider the looming economic disaster coming in most states and localities as bloated public sector union benefits--especially pension benefits--are essentially bankrupting the public sector. (See The Pension Fund that Ate California for a particularly detailed account of the problem.) A briefing paper from the left-leaning Brookings Institute explains:
The Providence Journal has observed that:
“At the bottom of it all is a political culture that rewarded politicians who made unsustainable promises, working in mutually beneficial tandem with public employee union leaders who extracted remarkably generous benefits without worrying about the long-term costs to the citizenry, especially when the inevitable recession arrived.”
Public employee unions are one of the most—if not the most—powerful political actors in state politics and have used that power to protect and expand the pension benefits of their members, as one would expect. As Healey, Hess and Nicholson have observed:
“Public sector unions are often highly involved in raising funds and donating to the campaigns of political candidates, often with the goal of preserving the pension status quo ... As important as it may be to take on the challenge [of pension reform] many lawmakers are still politically incentivized to maintain the status quo for as long as possible.”
Why do union leaders support pension policies that threaten to undermine the ability of a state to deliver promised benefits to their members? Dr. Thomas H. Little from the State Legislative Leaders Foundation noted that it has a lot to do with internal union politics: “Union representatives tend not to look long-term but rather focus on the short-term interests of the current and retired members who elected them and on whom they depend for re-election. These folks tend to be adamantly opposed to cuts in their benefits.”
Public sector unionism is thus inherently at odds with the common good, as it impedes the ability of the State to provide basic services to citizens at large.
In sum, the late Cardinal Edward Egan was thus correct when he argued at a 2011 conference on work (50 J. Cath. Legal Stud. 149) that:
There is a basic difference between the public employee and the private employee. You cannot fairly say, “Here is an argument for the private employee,” and apply it without distinction to the public employee. That tactic may get you through an opinion piece in a newspaper, but it will not work in a serious discussion where the participants are free to demand precise definitions and, above all, clear distinctions.
I call on Bishop McElroy to heed that warning and address squarely whether CST's plain teaching on private unions in fact ought to extend to public sector unions in whole or part.
Posted at 05:53 PM in Business, Religion | Permalink
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An email from SSRN reports:
Your paper, "INTEREST GROUP ANALYSIS OF DELAWARE LAW: THE CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY DOCTRINE AS CASE STUDY", was recently listed on SSRN's Top Ten download list for: FEN: Legal Systems & Agency Conflicts (Topic) and Fiduciary Law eJournal.
As of 14 January 2017, your paper has been downloaded 25 times. You may view the abstract and download statistics at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2894577.
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Here's the citation and abstract for the paper:
Bainbridge, Stephen M., Interest Group Analysis of Delaware Law: The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine as Case Study (January 5, 2017). UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 17-01. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2894577
Abstract:
Number of Pages in PDF File: 25
Keywords: Corporate Opportunity Doctrine, Fiduciary Duties, Directors, Officers, Interest Groups, Indeterminacy, Judicial Incentives
JEL Classification: K22
Posted at 07:29 AM in Corporate Law, Dept of Self-Promotion, Economic Analysis Of Law | Permalink
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I am no fan of John Chevedden, the famous (or, if you prefer, infamous) shareholder activist (or, if you prefer, gadfly), but even a stopped clock is right twice a day. Per SEC Rule 14a-8, Chevedden recently put forward the following proposal for inclusion in HP Inc.'s annual proxy statement:
RESOLVED: Shareholders request that our Board adopt a corporate governance policy to initiate or restore in-person annual meetings and publicize this policy to investors.
Our management has adopted procedures allowing it to discontinue a Corporate America tradition - a physical stockholders meeting and "substitute" a virtual meeting - an alarming decision.
Internet-only meetings should not be substituted for traditional in-person annual meetings. The tradition of in-person annual meetings plays an important role in holding management accountable to stockholders.
Personally, I think Chevedden is wrong about the substantive merits of internet-only meetings. They are perfectly lawful in most (all?) states and an increasingly efficient means of shareholder communication.
But I also disagree with the SEC's conclusion that the proposal could be omitted under the exception for ordinary business matters.
The problem, of course, is that the Rule 14a-8(i)(7) exclusion of ordinary business maters is a badly screwed up mess. My article Revitalizing SEC Rule 14a-8’s Ordinary Business Exclusion: Preventing Shareholder Micromanagement By Proposal, 85 Fordham Law Review 705 (2016), which is available online here, documented that Rule 14a-8(i)(7) is intended to permit exclusion of a proposal that “seeks to ‘micro-manage’ the company by probing too deeply into matters of a complex nature upon which shareholders, as a group, would not be in a position to make an informed judgment.”
Unfortunately, court decisions have largely eviscerated the ordinary business operations exclusion. For example, corporate decisions involving “matters which have significant policy, economic or other implications inherent in them” may not be excluded as ordinary business matters. This creates a gap through which countless proposals have made it onto corporate proxy statements.
The Article proposes an alternative standard that is not only grounded in relevant state corporate law principles but is easier to administer than the existing judicial tests. Under it, courts first look to the state law definition of ordinary business matters. The court then determines whether the matter is one of substance rather than procedure. Only proposals passing muster under both standards should be deemed proper.
Under my proposed test, shareholder proposals that try to mandate how the board should decide specific substantive business decisions are excludible as matters of ordinary business, but proposals that define the process and procedures by which those decisions are made are permissible. Chevedden's proposal goes to how the shareholders meet and thus falls on the procedure side of the line. It therefore should not be a matter of ordinary business.
Posted at 12:11 PM | Permalink
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Does anybody still care? Personally, the only remaining piece of the Games of Thrones series I plan on reading is a recap of the final HBO episode to find out how it comes out.
Posted at 05:15 PM in Books | Permalink
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