Bass Berry has a very good blog post on board oversight of ESG issues. They explain that a number of developments, including "the heightened consideration of institutional investors and proxy advisory firms on ESG board oversight and ESG considerations more generally, as well as various recent proposed rules and initiatives of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) with respect to ESG matters, including the proposed climate rules issued by the SEC earlier this year," have induced many boards of directors to assume direct oversight of ESG issues.
They further explain that:
Most public companies have an oversight structure whereby the full board has sole or dual (along with a board committee) primary oversight responsibilities with respect to at least certain ESG matters. The approach of having the entire board be primarily responsible for the oversight of certain ESG matters may reflect that a particular matter is viewed as a core responsibility of the full board. ...
However, there is a trend toward the increasing delegation of ESG matters to board committees. For example, according to an EY study of Fortune 100 companies in 2021, 85% of the surveyed companies disclosed that a committee of the board oversaw environmental sustainability or corporate responsibility matters, compared to 78% in 2020. While these figures are likely higher among Fortune 100 companies than public companies as a whole, this increase between 2020 and 2021 reflects a trend toward greater board committee oversight of ESG matters occurring more generally among U.S. public companies.
They do not suggest that Caremark concerns are driving board attention to ESG issues. But I worry that that's coming down the pike:
Since the foundational decision in In re Caremark Intern. Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996), Delaware corporate law has required boards of directors to establish reasonable legal compliance programs. Although Caremark has been applied almost exclusively with respect to law and accounting compliance, the original Caremark decision contemplated applying the oversight duty to the corporation’s “business performance.” Accordingly, there is no doctrinal reason that Caremark claims should not lie in cases in which the corporation suffered losses, not due to a failure to comply with applicable laws, but rather due to lax risk management.
The question thus arises as to whether Caremark should be extended to board failures to exercise oversight with respect to environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors. Obviously, where existing legislation or regulations impose compliance obligations in ESG-related areas, such as human resources, the environment, or worker safety, Caremark already applies. As such, boards must “ensure that compliance and monitoring systems are in place” to oversee corporate compliance with those laws.
Many ESG issues are not yet the subject to legal requirements, however. The question addressed in this Article is whether the board’s Caremark obligations should be extended to encompass oversight of corporate performance with such issues. In other words, should the board face potential liability not just for failing to ensure that the company has adequate reporting and monitoring systems in place to insure compliance with ESG-related legal requirements, but also to monitor ESG risks in areas where corporate compliance would be voluntary or aspirational.
Bainbridge, Stephen Mark, Don’t Compound the Caremark Mistake by Extending it to ESG Oversight (September 2021). Business Lawyer (September 2021), UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 21-10, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3899528
